THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTION AND INFORMATION ACCESS RIGHTS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES IN VIETNAM
Vol. 135 No. 6C (2026), Tạp chí Khoa học Đại học Huế: Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn
Vol. 135 No. 6C (2026)

THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTION AND INFORMATION ACCESS RIGHTS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES IN VIETNAM

Tạp chí Khoa học Đại học Huế: Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn
https://doi.org/10.26459/hueunijssh.v135i6C.7810
Published 2026-08-27
Tran Ha Linh Do
Trường đại học Kinh tế - Đại học Đà Nẵng

Abstract

The oversight of company management to ensure that executives act in the best interests of the company and safeguard the legal rights and interests of shareholders and other stakeholders is widely recognized as a core function underlying the establishment of the independent director position in public joint-stock companies. However, one of the most prevalent challenges faced by independent directors is the issue of information asymmetry between themselves and the company’s internal executives. This paper examines the critical importance of information access rights for independent directors, analyzes the obstacles they frequently encounter in obtaining timely and adequate information essential to the performance of their supervisory duties, and highlights key deficiencies in the current Vietnamese legal framework governing such rights in public companies. On that basis, the article advances several recommendations aimed at refining the relevant legal provisions and enhancing the effectiveness of their implementation in practice.

   
https://doi.org/10.26459/hueunijssh.v135i6C.7810
PDF (Vietnamese)

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